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The goal of any business is to extrapolate maximum efficiency // output at the cheapest cost possible. The National Hockey League's salary cap -- which employs a ceiling for all thirty National Hockey League franchises to operate at or under -- tries to encourage fiscal efficiency, and in some respects, it's been an effective tool.
Far too often, though, we see franchises near the league-wide threshold suffering from the same on-ice problems (or, alternatively, enjoying comparable success) to teams with less operating expenses // expenditures.
The golden rule in the big market v. small market saga is that the former has the economic luxury of making mistakes -- contracts may cripple their short-term success, but in the long-run, the bottom line will not suffer due to a seemingly endless pit of money. The latter has to play with smart money at all times, as a series of bad moves could force the franchise into a decade of obsolescence.
One commonality between the two, though, is that the salary cap -- and the maximum dollars allowed as allocations on a per season basis --
encourages smart spending. In the short-term, mistakes are realizable across the board; consider the Montreal Canadiens, who struggle to address other measurable needs due to ugly contracts like Scott Gomez(~$7.3M per).
Ditto smaller-market New York(I), who are bottled up by Rick DiPietro's heinous deal for eternity.
The driving point? Big market teams will recover with relative ease from bad deals, but it doesn't change the status quo with respect to the on-ice product on a year-to-year basis. Thanks to the salary cap, a bad contract does not discriminate -- it punishes with brutality.
Teams have tried to become more cognizant of their spending in recent years, looking -- as mentioned above -- for the most productive work force (or, roster) at the cheapest total dollar. It's a utopian idea, but as a business model, it's the only one that ensures long-term success.
One area where this strategy is probably most applicable? Between the pipes. With all due respect to rule exceptions like Jonathan Quick and Henrik Lundqvist, goaltending is a fairly overrated commodity.
See, quality of goaltending is just about as important as any other metric in the overall performance of the team, but the disparity between the thirty National Hockey League starters is pretty minimal, especially when you get rid of the top // bottom outliers.
In today's market, there's only a couple of truly elite goaltenders; those who can and will succeed in most any instance, no matter how porous the defense. I've long advocated that Henrik Lundqvist is the National Hockey League's best goaltender, mostly because I remember how dominant he was against ridiculous shot quality. It's no surprise that his numbers(.930 save percentage, 1.97 GAA) skyrocketed past his career splits once the defensive play improved.
Therein lies the focal point, though: Defensive play is just as important as goaltending, and really, the two work hand-in-hand. A strong defense can insulate an average goaltender. A strong goaltender can marginalize the ineffectiveness of an average defense. The difference is that the former is a bit easier to develop than the latter -- I'll touch on this in a bit.
However, high-end, first-pairing NHL defensemen -- be it offensive or two-way types -- don't grow on trees. For every Shea Weber, Zdeno Chara, and Erik Karlsson, there's a plethora of league-average replacements that can fluidly draw into most any NHL roster. Thus, it puts a premium on the guys who truly get the job done.
Back to the goaltending, though: With the extreme outliers(to qualify it, let's call it Lundqvist/Quick on one end, Mason/Roloson on the other) out of the game, the numbers are pretty comparable -- especially when you consider the external variables, or the team that said goaltender was skating with.
It shouldn't come as a surprise that Tampa Bay -- a team that played essentially no defense all year long, with two goaltenders(Garon/Roloson) who couldn't get the job done, either -- had one of the worst GAA in the NHL. We all agree? Right.
Perhaps it's the other names at the bottom of the list, though, that highlight the overvaluing of the Grade-A goaltender in the NHL. Consider some of the goaltenders that finished outside of the top-twenty with respect to save percentage(a raw metric, admittedly):
Cam Ward -- Carolina Hurricanes(.915, $6.3M)
Marc-Andre Fleury -- Pittsburgh Penguins (.913, $5.0M)
Jonas Hiller -- Anaheim Ducks (.910, $4.5M)
Ilya Bryzgalov -- Philadelphia Flyers (.909, $5.6M)
Martin Brodeur -- New Jersey Devils (.908, $5.2M)
On average, a .911 save percentage. The cost? In total, $26.6M.
Now, for a parallel, consider another group of five goaltenders(in fairness, avoiding any G who does not have future RFA status):
Brian Elliott -- St. Louis Blues (.940, $1.8M)
Mike Smith -- Phoenix Coyotes (.930, $2.0M)
J.S. Giguere -- Colorado Avalanche (.919, $1.25M)
Tomas Vokoun -- (formerly) Washington Capitals(.917, $1.5M)
Craig Anderson -- Ottawa Senators (.914, $3.1M)
On average, a .92 save percentage, at a total cost of $9.65M -- about one third of what the former group costs. And, this could've been even more of a bloodbath, had I really cherry-picked examples like Jose Theodore(FLA) and Kari Lehtonen(DAL).
The refrain from detractors will be two-fold: (a) The first-group had a bad year, individually; and/or (b) played on poor defensive teams. I'll be the first one to agree.
However, my response will also come in a pair: (a) The first-group was victimized by shot variance/luck factor; and (b) The play of the defense or team in general would've been better had money been spent elsewhere.
Like it or not, hockey is a game that's based on luck. Skill gets you to the professional stages, but there's so many bounces -- be it good or bad in hockey -- that tend to throw in the occasional high/low extreme re: performance.
The goal on each night should be to hold a positive margin each night with respect to scoring opportunities. How do you create them while forcing the opposition's aside? Simple. Ice the best roster.
And, that's hard to do when so much of your money is tied up in an entity that really can't separate from a cheaper comparable with respect to productivity.
With a talent disparity at the F/D position between your high-end and league-average types far wider than the production at the goaltending position(Pekka Rinne and Devan Dubnyk were separated by .008 re: save percentage), smart money suggests that addressing the men in front of the crease is the best way to create a viable, winning hockey team.
Front offices may already be listening, though. All due respect to Roberto Luongo -- I still maintain he's one of the better G in the NHL, comfortably -- his price tag ($5.3M cap hit) doesn't leave a ton of wiggle room to address other areas, and Vancouver will ultimately have to lower their demands in order to find a trade suitor.
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Back with more tomorrow.
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Thanks for reading!
Ottawa Senators Blogger • 
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